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The Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset (2004 [1916]) coined a sentence that 
was to become a leitmotiv in the process of Spain’s integration into the European 
Community: ‘Spain is the problem, Europe the solution.’2 In 2006, for example, 
celebrating the twentieth anniversary of Spain’s entry into the European Economic 
Community (EEC), the sociologist Emilio Lamo de Espinosa, then Director of the 
Think Tank Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, after 
referring to Ortega’s original statement, added: 
 
The desire to Europeanize Spain, that is, to modernize it and move with the times, was 
not so much one of several elements in the political project of contemporary Spain, but 
its central core, the best summary, a project that brought together equally the left and 
the right, center and periphery, rich and poor. To Europeanize was to modernize and to 
modernize was to change. … Our Europeanism was incoming and not outgoing … We are 
European for reasons of domestic politics, not as an instrument of foreign politics. (2006) 
 
We must recall, however, that Ortega (2005 [1922]) sees the ‘problem of Spain’ in 
terms of a lack of internal cohesion paradoxically predicated in the incapability of 
generating an elite that can lead the ‘masses’ away from endangering the nation’s 
continuity. For Ortega, the problem of Spain manifests itself as ‘particularism’ (of 
the workers – obrerismo, and of the regions – separatismo). Particularism is seen as 
a pathological trend that endangers the continuity of the Spanish organism by tearing 
it apart. It is a ‘congenital weakness of its unity’. 
Therefore, when experts today use Ortega’s dictum ‘Spain is the problem, Europe 
the solution’ they point to the core relational meaning of Europe for Spain. Europe 
will be the cure for internal fragmentation expressed in national identities and 
class interests and will provide the basis for modernization. In the post-Francoist 
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a ‘unifying project’ for Spain, oriented towards the overcoming of the famous 
‘congenital particularism’ that had caused the Civil War. It is worth noting that 
overcoming national and class conflict was also at the core of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) at the origin of the EEC. 
This paper ethnographically explores what Europe meant for steel workers’ 
expectations of future wellbeing and how the accession to the EEC first, and later 
the advent of the global firm, affected their practical capabilities of organization. 
Focusing on the relationship between the global market, the nation state and the 
steel industry, it unpacks the centrality of particular models of economic devel- 
opment and political belonging in the production of workers’ understandings of their 
individual and collective agency. After two sections that provide a historical context, 
the following sections centre on the arguments and logics that union members of 
the Arcelor-Mittal steel plant in Asturias develop as they strategize to defend the 
plant and their jobs. In particular, I seek to unravel the spatial dimensions of labour 




Peace and Europe 
 
 
After the Second World War the aim of a peaceful future between the nations of 
Europe became synonymous with economic integration, centred on the creation 
of an open market for coal and steel. The Schuman declaration (9 May 1950), 
considered as the founding bloc of the EEC (1957), proposes: 
 
The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up 
of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of 
Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted 
to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant 
victims. The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war 
between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impos- 
sible.3 (emphasis added) 
 
The constitution of an economic community tied to the production and distri- 
bution of coal and steel was thus a political economic project where market 
integration around two key sectors was meant to prevent war and promote peace. 
The  idea  was  to  avoid  conflict through  promoting  industrial  collaboration  and 
free trade. Production and the unification of the market of member countries were 
the centrepieces in the project. At the same time a particular free-trade model of 
the ‘good’ economy was proposed, one that was being pushed forward by the 
United States in its reconstruction policies, through the Bretton-Woods institutions, 
American economic aid (Marshall Plan) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) rounds. An additional aim was ‘the equalization and improvement 
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while the creation of a common High Authority was aimed at curtailing national 
intervention in these markets for the common good of attaining durable peace, this 
free-market aspect was often overpowered by the national preoccupation with full 
employment and class unrest, what Harvey (2005) calls ‘embedded liberalism’. 
Both Europe and Spain came to envision economic union as a form of political 
integration and pacification. The idea of becoming part of Europe, as the ‘solution’ 
to Spain’s internal conflicts following Ortega’s idea, was a central argument for 
the implementation of neoliberal policies in Spain after 1975. I will focus on the 
industrial restructuring of the Spanish steelmaking industry in the context of Spain’s 
transition to democracy and its integration into the EEC. But I will try to make a 
wider point about the incorporation of the neoliberal economic model that came with 
it and its consequences for industrial working-class people in Spain. 
The central idea I want to put forward is that working-class people were asked 
to make huge economic (and political) sacrifices – by political leaders – in order 
to join Western democracies in Europe during the transition years (1975–82). The 
hope for democracy that had guided an entire generation of industrial workers 
became a real possibility, and entry into Europe (meaning the EEC) was to be its 
final accomplishment. But democracy and Europe, tied in this meaning to economic 
policy, soon became the way a neoliberal economic model was packaged for the 




Before Europe: The American Model Under Franco 
 
 
The nationalist economy of the early Franco regime was a peculiar mix of repression 
and paternalism for the working class (Babiano 1993; Molinero and Ysàs 1993). 
Repression was extreme but employment stability during the regime was a reality 
especially in the large strategic industries such as steel or shipbuilding. This was 
coupled with a closing of the labour market to women whose main calling was 
defined as housework. 
Two different periods of trade closure can be defined in the first twenty years 
after the Spanish Civil War (1936–39). First, ‘Autarky’, a Falangista model of self- 
sustaining economic autonomy (1939–46). Second, an import substitution model 
aimed at developing industry in order to achieve competitiveness (1946–59). This 
second period led to a third period of progressive liberalization after 1953 and the 
Madrid treaties with the United States (Viñas 2003). In 1963 the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, later World Bank) prescribed for Spain 
the articulation of monetary stabilization policies, the deregulation of the labour 
market and the liberalization of trade and foreign investment, while it opened the 
door to credit aid (IBRD 1963). Starting in 1959 economic policies of the Spanish 
Francoist governments will follow the model of development that the US had 
exported to the rest of western Europe after the Second World War, one based on 
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This liberalization model was at the time deemed compatible with state inter- 
vention intended to regulate the excesses of the market but not to substitute for it. 
‘Indicative planning’ was a model of economic regulation initiated in France after 
the Second World War and linked to postwar reconstruction (Ramos Gorostiza 
and Pires Jiménez 2009). One of its major proponents was Jean Monnet the first 
president of the High Authority of the ECSC and one of the founders of the 
EEC. ‘Indicative planning’ was a technical device based on macroeconomic data 
(input–output  tables,  national  accounting)  that  would  enable  economic  actors 
to make rational decisions. The state’s role was to gather and make available 
this  macroeconomic  information  and  to  coordinate  the  national  economy  and 
its different sectors in relation to long-term economic development targets. The 
state had to interfere minimally with market forces, but it had to make decisions 
as to which sectors of the economy should receive incentives because they were 
thought to represent the ground base of any further development. The state also 
aimed at guaranteeing social peace through targeting full employment. Spain 
followed  the  French  ‘Development  Plans’ centred  on  ‘key’ industries  (steel, 
energy, shipbuilding) that would be given preference by the state. In its 1963 
report, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development supported the 
adoption of ‘indicative planning’ as a way to liberalization and economic devel- 
opment for Spain (IBRD 1963: 3). The 1960s Spanish industrial development 
plans have subsequently been strongly criticized on various grounds, with most 
critiques stressing their inefficiency and continued constraints on full liber- 
alization (Ramos Gorostiza and Pires Jiménez 2009). However, other European 
nations were implementing similar policies of intervention and subsidizing of 
heavy industry throughout the 1950s and 1960s, in blatant contradiction to ECSC 
open market objectives. Even later on, the ‘Davignon plan’ of 1977, and approval 
of the ‘manifest crisis’ clause in 1981 in the second Davignon plan that installed 
production quotas, expressed the collective support within the ECSC for strong 
political intervention in times of sectoral crisis, in an attempt to guide restruc- 
turing of the sector (Alter and Steinberg 2007). 
Indicative planning had two fundamental consequences that are central for the 
discussion of this chapter. First, it introduced a particular technical language into 
economic practice, one that seemed to supersede the political language that had 
infused economic thinking and decisions up to that moment. Macroeconomic data 
were to be the guides for economic policies and they appeared as devoid of political 
intention. In Spain, the economists that came to power with that project were aptly 
called ‘technocrats’. Macroeconomic language would eventually become such a 
hegemonic force as to pervade the discourse of the democratic trade unions and put 
an end to the politicized, often revolutionary, aspect of the unions that had re-emerged 
during the Franco regime (Martínez-Alier and Roca Jusmet 1988). Second, however, 
indicative planning favoured key sector industries that could benefit from economies 
of scale and Fordist modernization, and gave workers in these industries a job that 
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policies. As a result the workers’ position within these sectors was strengthened, 
which eventually enabled the reconstruction of class-based trade unions. 
Under  the  governments  of  Francoist  ‘technocrats’  a  model  of  governance 
emerged where economy substituted for politics, and economic ‘modernization’ 
was the argument overpowering the realities of exploitation, oppression and 
repression. As Maier has put it for post-Second World War: ‘In the last analysis, 
the politics of productivity that emerged as the American organizing idea for the 
postwar economic world depended upon superseding class conflict with economic 
growth’ (1977: 629; see also 1981). This was presented as a natural force, a logical 
necessity, requiring sacrifices for a better good. This American model was embraced 
by Spanish ‘technocrats’ as early as 1957.4  With this move, the Franco regime 
decidedly turned towards a form of ‘modern’ liberal capitalism that would fully 




The Ethnography in Context: Images of Europe in the Transition5 
 
 
What were the hopes of steel workers during the Transition? During Francoism 
there was one, quite straightforward, political hope: the end of the dictatorship, the 
attainment of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’. Freedom was interpreted as ‘freedom’ of 
association, of speech and of movement, mostly referring to political freedom (free 
unions, free parties). Europe was the expression of this longing. Europe was also 
seen through the narratives of Spanish migrants coming back home for vacation with 
consumer goods. Consumption of goods such as household electrical appliances 
and cars increasingly became an expression of wellbeing. These images of Europe 
contrast with the memories of the Civil War, the realities of repression, the very low 
salaries, hunger (los años del hambre) and precarious social benefits, and the image 
of Spain as being isolated from Western democracies, being ‘different’ in a negative 
way: ‘Spain is different’ was the self-deprecatory saying. 
The image of the economy of that period was constructed as one of ‘backwardness’ 
by liberal and social democrat economists alike. The former decried state inter- 
vention, tariff barriers and the rigidities of the labour market. The latter pointed to 
corruption, oligopolies and corporativist relations of production. However, if we 
look at the economic policies and decisions being made for the ‘key’ industry of 
steel after the Second World War within the ECSC by Western democratic states, 
there is little difference from Spanish policies: dirigisme of national industry and 
protection of jobs through prices, tariffs, subsidies, cartels and bailouts. As in 
other  European  countries,  private  industrialists  were  often  those  investing  less 
and maintaining obsolete facilities and being ‘protected’ by the state, while public 
industries in these sectors were often the more technologically advanced. Thus, the 
perception that settled in the minds of workers in the steel industry, of Spain having 
policies that were hugely different from those simultaneously occurring in Europe, 
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The transition period brought workers great expectations: the hopes of political 
freedom, fair economic distribution and social rights that had been lost during 
the dictatorship. These hopes could be summarized as: 1) having a Western-style 
multi-party democracy (for most workers the appeal of real existing socialism 
had dwindled); 2) having strong and free-trade unions and the right to strike; and 
3) having a better life through increased salaries, consumption of goods and the 
expansion of public health, education and a reliable social security system. All of 
this, in a way, was expressed in the image of Europe as a ‘social market economy’. 
Very quickly, however, the transition discourse gave way to a realpolitic based on 
permanent agreements between the different parties, and between unions, businessmen 
and the state. The Pacto de la Moncloa (1977) was the first of a series of agreements 
generally compliant with the macroeconomic technical projections and objectives of 
mainstream economists: curbing inflation, stimulating growth, increasing produc- 
tivity and competitiveness. The politics of ‘agreement’ [concertación] were described 
by some as neo-corporativist because they incorporated trade unions into the increas- 
ingly neoliberal policies of democratic governments and ‘because macroeconomic 
orientations  become  the  basis  of  social  agreements’ (Martínez-Alier  and  Roca 
Jusmet 1988: 59). Conversely, the UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores) leader 
Justo Domínguez perceived it as a new form of ‘trade unionism which is inserted in 
the State’s institutions, a trade unionism of participation, that is or tries to be where 
decisions are made’ (Domínguez 1990: 98).7  This situation produced a discursive 
hegemony that would frame industrial workers’ protests and struggles in a particular 
‘language of contention’ that was that of the dominant groups but appeared to be 
neutral, technical and universal (Roseberry 1994). Often, this was interpreted as a 
move towards an advanced form of European unionism, based on negotiation rather 
than on confrontation as had been the case during the dictatorship, one not based on 
ideology but on technical realities and rational economic decisions. 
Here a note on Spanish unionism is necessary because memories of the strong 
politicization and social transformation aims of the labour movement during the long 
years of clandestine re-organization are a constant referent in workers’ discourses 
(Narotzky 2014). Although the trend towards bureaucratic unionism became, as I 
have pointed out before, a mark of ‘modernization’, of what being a union in Europe 
meant for many leaders, there remained a strong rank-and-file commitment particu- 
larly in the heavy industry sectors. Because during the dictatorship claims had always 
been both ‘economic’ and ‘political’ the component of what has been described as 
community unionism was always important and one would find the same people 
involved in union activism and in neighbourhood association activism in industrial 
areas. In many heavily industrialized areas, moreover, what happened in the factory 
was very much a part of what the community’s life was about and unions’ activism 
addressed issues such as housing and infrastructure facilities (Collins 2012; Kasmir 
and Carbonella 2008).8  In the 1980s, for example, the first restructuring of heavy 
industry resulted in high unemployment and an epidemic of heroin abuse among the 
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often organized around union activists, were key to the development of community 
clinics and rehabilitation centres as well as to furthering claims of general public 
services provisioning. Retraining courses were also one of the central claims of 
the unions after the transition ‘agreements’, especially in areas hit by restructuring 
redundancies. Finally, unions were attached to parties and were ‘political’, until the 
1980s allegedly aiming at a radical social transformation. The separation between 
the socialist (social-democrat) and the communist parties and, respectively, the UGT 
and the Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) unions was part of the ‘modernization’ and 
‘Europeanization’ of both unions and parties after the Transition. 
After the Transition to Democracy, the first socialist government of Felipe 
González started a restructuring of heavy industry preparing Spain for incorporation 
into the EEC and the ‘challenge of competitiveness’. This trend has continued until 
the present through various moments of restructuring and job loss and the present 




New Business Models: The Struggle for Investment and Profitability 
 
 
The process of restructuring the Spanish steel industry that began in the early 1980s 
has not yet ended. The public steelworks ENSIDESA had incorporated several 
private factories from 1973 to 1993 (UNINSA, AHV) making it the largest plant 
in Spain. This process was meant to create a restructured and financially healthy 
company (CSI) ready for privatization. During the 1990s the process led to privati- 
zation through various stages of foreign capital takeover: first Aceralia (1998), then 
Arcelor (2001) and finally Arcelor-Mittal (2006). 
Restructuring in the 1980s was considered a necessity stemming from the low 
profitability of the Spanish industrial fabric that was a consequence of the Francoist 
policies. This was admitted by the workers, and it was understood as part of the 
economic sacrifices needed to become part of ‘modern’ Europe. So investment 
and profitability became the key logics in the union leadership’s strategies, and a 
hallmark of their being a form of ‘modern’ European trade unionism that some 
workers resented. In the words of Antonio, a union representative for CCOO: 
 
The issue of profitability [rentabilidad] is hard to take on [by union members]. Normally 
you think of resistance unionism [sindicalismo resistente] and really what you have 
to do is participatory unionism [sindicalismo propuesta], [otherwise] we would bring 
in bankruptcy. So we had to close some plants and not others, so why close one and 
not another? The answer is based on profitability [rentabilidad]. […] We learned this 
quickly. We were not like ‘European trade unionists’ [sindicalistas europeos] because we 
had come out of Francoism and clandestinity … but we soon learnt. (2010) 
 
For Juan, a former anarcho-syndicalist rank-and-file worker, this was the expression 
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the firm’ (J. R. 2011). Indeed, the porosity between union leadership and Human 
Resources departments that has been pointed at in other cases (Mollona 2009) could 
also be found in this plant at least in one case. But, generally, workers tended to 
admit that the new environment required a new form of unionism that was able to 
understand the challenges of globalization. 
The emphasis on profitability became central in the first restructuring period 
tied to the global steel crisis, the reduction of overcapacity and the accession to 
the EEC.9 Here the relational understanding of Spain vis-à-vis Europe is central. 
Spain’s industry was backward because of the policies of the dictatorship. Support 
of inefficient private companies and corrupt management had been lethal. In some 
accounts we also find the idea that while all of Europe had been restructuring heavy 
industry since the 1960s, Spain was not following suit and got left behind. Yet this 
is incorrect. Mining was partially restructured in the late 1950s in the European 
Community, but also in Spain. Steel did not enter crisis until 1974, with restruc- 
turing really taking place in Europe after 1980, which is when it started to get 
underway in Spain as well. Nevertheless, the widespread understanding is that what 
Europe had done, Spain had to do in order to ‘catch up’. 
 
Here we had a dictatorship and that’s why the situation is the way it is – that’s why we 
didn’t restructure earlier like the rest of Europe … more than blaming Europe, I think we 
blamed ourselves. Blamed the dictatorship for this – people realized that under Franco 
you were producing basically just to produce. (2010) 
 
Simultaneously the model of the large ‘public enterprise’ is described as being 
created ‘to give work’ (2011), and it did give direct work to some 27,000 men 
before restructuring began in the 1980s. It was an ‘untenable model … [but] one 
that made sense in that period when the primary concern was that people have 
work, social peace, and everybody happy … . There were none of the expectations 
of management that we have today, profitability, productivity, competitiveness, all 
those terms we use nowadays’ (2011). 
The idea of ‘not missing the train’ [no perder el tren] of Europe and modernity 
was repeated by political, economic and union elites as an ‘argument’ for restruc- 
turing industry and for adopting a particular increasingly neoliberal economic model 
based on open markets, competitiveness and profitability. For the steel industry in 
Europe, the problem of competitiveness was often not so much one of profitability 
but of overcapacity as a result of the worldwide optimistic expansionary forecasts of 
the late 1960s that led to investment and increased capacity just as the crisis of 1973 
dramatically reduced demand (Hudson and Sadler 1989). As a result, plant closure 
became the mandatory industrial policy all over Europe but often with profitability 
as the main argument given to the local unions, which were coopted into saving their 
plant through restructuring. 
But betting on profitability meant increasing productivity, which in turn meant 
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mostly during the first (1983–6) and second (1993–6) restructuring periods. To 
Arturo, a CCOO union representative now working in the Human Resources 
department, profitability is always a term for personnel reduction: ‘When you speak 
of restructuring processes you know what you are talking about, you are talking 
about productivity, you are talking about staff … . And when you talk about staff 
you know you are talking about reducing it’ (2011). 
Further structural transformations became apparent during the privatization 
process in the 1990s. There was a moment when distancing between workers and 
management increased in such a way that there was a qualitative change. And this 
process is expressed in an opposition between foreign national interests and local 
regional ones. In a narrative of the privatization process Arturo recalls: 
 
[after the final privatization that produced Arcelor] when we have the Belgians, the 
French and ourselves [the Spanish], then we can see a breakdown between the model 
of the public enterprise [local, paternalist] and that of the private enterprise [global, 
profit-oriented] in the bad sense.10 We can observe that decisions are made very far from 
Asturias, and you lose control of the decision making process. … (2011) 
 
There is a sense in which this “you lose control” is both a class term and a regional 
term that refers to the ‘public’ interest of the industry in terms of its weight in 
the area’s gross domestic product (GDP) and the wellbeing of many locals. This 
distancing and loss culminates with the selling of Arcelor to Mittal in 2006. Arcelor- 
Mittal is a multinational, and business plans are designed at the level of the firm, 
not at the level of each individual plant. This is understood by workers as a break 
of responsibility links, where central managers do not care about what happens 
to any individual plant, nor, obviously, to its workforce. But this also creates a 
terrible dilemma for union representatives. Mittal headquarters are in Luxemburg, 
and representatives of local unions have to go there to negotiate. They must show 
a united front if they want to save their plant, and there is no room for nuances. As 
Ismael (a UGT representative) said: 
 
You might think sometimes that [here in Spain] UGT and CCOO [originally attached to 
the socialist and communist parties respectively] confront each other … but the focus 
of Europe changes everything […]. In Europe people speak of the Spanish delegation, 
nobody argues and we don’t show different viewpoints. We eat together, we design the 
lines of action. We had to overcome the [old] image when central union committees […] 
were 200 meters from the factory management, there you had the one who was in charge 
and you didn’t have to look further. You went there and you said ‘no, we are not going 
to accept this, and we stopped the factory, but now what would we be stopping? We do 
not amount to more than 4 per cent of Arcelor-Mittal. A speck on a map. This requires 
a change of mentality and of strategy. Some things we can negotiate at the local level 
because the managers here have authority on the subject, other things you cannot. The 
forum is in Luxemburg; there you have the general management. […] Now you have to 
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This  contradiction  is  something  that  is  extremely  central  in  union  representa- 
tives’ discourse and it relates to the crucial theme: the need to be competitive, to 
be profitable, not only in terms of the global market for steel, but also in terms of 
internal competition with other plants in the same firm. And, as a consequence of 
this, the union’s insistence on the importance of the firm’s investment in the plant as 
a working-class strategy, leading to a form of ‘economic nationalism’. At the same 
time, unions are trying to develop a common front in face of the global firm through 
European and International union committees. Ismael further explains: 
 
Because firms are organized in terms of competitiveness and competitiveness makes 
enemies. […] As part of the European [Union] committee you have to defend that 
[closings] do not occur […] but automatically you are thinking of your blast furnaces. 
It is important to have a good communication [among the European Union committee]. 
But what is good news for me might be bad news for you, and this has to be debated at 
the union level, and it is a long debate. This is the global firm. (2011) 
 
But Mittal is not only any other global firm. It is the largest steel company in the 
world, which makes it possible for it to control prices in the steel market, in order to 
capture a larger share of the market. This, however, has negative consequences for 
many of its less profitable companies – with higher costs and lower demand, mostly 
those situated in Europe – in that they are forced to sell below their production cost. 
So that the firm’s global profitability is endangering the profitability of local plants, 
and it is also forcing them, through the market, to increase their profitability. In 
Arturo’s words: 
 
You sell underneath the production price because Mittal is forcing market prices to 
change, by dumping in the market products with a lower cost of production, he gets more 
profitability but he also leaves you with your pants down [con el culo al aire]. This is 
a global world and competition is internal [to the firm]. It is like a family with lots of 
siblings where we all fight to eat the soup while it’s hot [por comer la sopa caliente]. 
(2011) 
 
For  the  unions,  the  contradiction  created  by  this  logic  is  that  between  the 
objective to save the local plant and employment locally, the need to be responsible 
towards steelworkers at home but also in the global firm, and the crucial under- 
standing that there is no responsibility towards any locality or people on the part 
of general management or the firm. While unions are driven to frame solidarity 
first in local terms, their bosses are acting in global terms (Kasmir 2014). And they 
know it. Competitiveness, the key concept of the neoliberal discourse, then also 
becomes the key concept in the unions’ leadership strategy to save the local plant. 
Competitiveness, productivity and profitability become reconfigured as a bastion of 
regional economy. But this has two unavoidably negative results: 1) that produc- 















‘Spain is the Problem, Europe the Solution’ 
 
 
between plants destroys the solidarity of the working class in the globalized firm 
(see also Hudson and Sadler 1989). To quote the socialist union representative 
Ismael once more: 
 
Arcelor-Mittal represents 11% of the GDP of Asturias. There are 100,000 people living 
in Asturias. Somebody thinks that the hand of Lakshmi Mittal would tremble [if he 
thought of closing the plant]? We only can fight with results. You have to show results, 
to be competitive, and it is a one-way journey, because Mittal’s present politics is that 
Mittal does not believe in Europe, he does not believe in European steel because of the 
European tradition of social policies that do not exist in other parts of the world. That 
becomes a handicap11  and so there is no interest, the interest is in investing in Brazil, 
Mexico, China, India, but not in Europe. […] When Mittal bought [the Arcelor plant in 
Asturias] there was a deficit in the world steel market [2006]. With the crisis everything 
collapses and now we see the truth of Mittal’s politics: ‘I need plants that can equally 
produce 5 tons or 2 tons, depending on the market’. …. The best situation [for Mittal] 
would be to subcontract work personnel to external firms when needed. This is the 
industrial politics of the future, and it is true panic. You are never going to be as compet- 
itive as China or Mexico, you won’t make it. … First products fall, then workshops 
fall, and then plants fall, no way we are going to stand the pull. (2011, emphasis added) 
 
2 
In terms of the European strategies of multinational firms, it seems to be the case 
that there is almost no investment in integrated steel plants anymore. A major reason 
for this seems to be European environmental legislation setting maximum CO 
emission quotas for steel plants that have to be attained or traded for at a cost. The 
European ‘Emission Trading System’ for steel has been described by the president 
of the Consultative Commission for Industrial Change as ‘diabolic’.12 It has driven 
the European business steel association Eurofer to go to court – with union support 
– in order to change the benchmarking of emission capacity set by the Commission. 
The threat being that plants will relocate to free emission countries. Moreover, as 
transportation costs increase, it becomes again a rational move to get plants closer to 
raw materials (iron or coking coal). So union leaders are in the paradoxical position 
of siding up with European business in order to ask for less environmental regulation 
from the EEC in order to save their plants, without really knowing if firms, which 
are mostly multinationals, are really interested in saving European plants in the long 
run, or are just trying to eschew their social responsibilities once more (for a related 




Territories and Nations 
 
Since the 1980s’ need to restructure in order to become ‘competitive’, the unions 
understood that the regional aspect was a crucial instrument of struggle, a situation 
that continues up to the present. The struggle became a struggle between regions in 
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[For political reasons] we saw the impossibility [for the state] of destroying all the 
industrial fabric of the country: in Asturias, we realized right away that closures were 
inevitable and this is when we began to raise the issue of investing – investing in the 
plant and making it more modern in order to make it more profitable. That we were 
demanding investment was shocking when everyone was talking about [overcapacity] 
cuts, about saving money. I think this was a good move because we managed to secure 
investments  that are modern and profitable [rentable].  […] The unions [sindicatos] 
were the ones proposing this. I think the [initial] idea was to close the steel industry and 
instead we got them to invest. 
We did have an advantage too [in Asturias], because the crisis in steel coincided with 
the crisis in mining [la minería] and we also had the shipyards [la Naval] […] So, the 
defense of steel [siderurgia] was embedded in that of the regional industry and was 
turned into the defense of a region. Mobilization in the 1980s had the slogan ‘salvar 
Ensidesa y salvar Asturias’ [‘save Ensidesa and save Asturias’] – and that [regional 
situation] worked in our favor. […] We had an advantage, making it a regional problem 
and not just a company problem meant that people helped us, people who normally 
wouldn’t have helped. (2010, emphasis added) 
 
The national or regional delimitation of an economic space that has to be 
defended becomes a moral instrument that unions have been using in order to make 
local and national governments responsible, as well as the managers of local plants 
of multinational firms or the owners of small and medium enterprises (Beynon, 
Hudson and Sadler 1994). It expresses the entanglement of so-called bureaucratic 
and community unionism, but it does so by defining a space, a territory, which 
makes sense to a large constituency. In parallel, the regional or territorial delimi- 
tation of economic destinies is reinforced through the EEC territorial units (NUTS) 
that are used as statistical areas for the compilation of macroeconomic data and are 
the focus of structural and cohesion funds. These, in turn, contribute to the interest 
on the part of firms or entrepreneurs to locate particular ‘projects’ in particular areas 
that can opt for subsidies from these European funds.13  As funds are often linked 
to retraining schemes in de-industrializing areas, and as vocational training is often 
controlled by unions, the regional aspect is also a central aspect in union’s strategies. 
Thus, territorial economic identity gets reconfigured through the particular relations 
of specific regions to European subsidies. 
It would seem, then, that the hegemonic language is that of neoliberalism, and 
unions are at pains to take the struggle into a different framework. Their struggle 
is trapped in the immediacy of fighting to keep jobs, to keep the local plant going 
and to keep the region alive (Herod 2001; Sanchez and Strümpell 2014). They lack 
an alternative framework in which to analyse economic processes after the gener- 
alized dismissal of political and revolutionary unionism during the Transition, and 
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is a sense in which they do not give in and keep on struggling and the struggle is 
real (Kasmir 2009). There is, undoubtedly a sense of defeat in the face of global 
competition, often in-firm globalized competition. A sense of awkwardness because 
the promise of Europe has been a deadly trap: European regulations, such as the 
Emission Trading System and environmental and security regulations, are collective 
social benefits that turn into poison in a neoliberal framework that defines territories 
in terms of their profitability or competitive advantage, in the abstract. This explains 
why territory, proximity and an attempt to produce responsibility outside abstract 
models are increasingly successful in these corners of Europe, as the example of 
economic nationalism or regionalism shows here. This explains why a return to new 
forms of corporativism based on national identity and inter-class responsibility are 
substituting for the ‘old’ class confrontation, and often stirring racist and chauvin- 
istic attitudes among the working class (see Kalb 2011, 2009). This is a deadly trap 







So where does Europe stand now? Has it been dissolved by global markets? Has 
it  been  dissolved  by  financial capitalism  where  production  doesn’t  matter  any 
longer? For many steelworkers in Asturias, now, Europe was the beginning of this 
global nightmare of perpetual competition and layoffs. It was the beginning of the 
neoliberal turn, but the Transition in Spain glossed over these new realities in a 
perverse manner. Admittedly, Europe provided a defence, for a while, through the 
subsidies aimed at convergence. But that ‘gift’ also proved to be a double bind in 
the end, for it was premised on the dismantling of the industrial fabric, initially with 
generous subsidies for early retirement, unemployment funds and retraining. As 
Spain entered the EEC, the welfare Europe of the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, 
was quickly disappearing. The peace project enclosed in the original ECSC treaty 
of Paris (1951) that was based on production – the union of industrial interest 
and workforce welfare – within Europe now seems superseded by the circuits of 
financial capital. 
For Asturian steelworkers, this neoliberal reality is experienced as an imposition 
of abstract models that do not take into account human beings, human relations 
and personal responsibilities. Abstraction and distancing are the hallmark of this 
form of capitalism, which has been creeping in for a long time. The last turn of 
the screw is expressed for these workers as the substitution of industrial capitalism 
by financial capitalism where profits become increasingly unrelated to production. 
As Antonio describes it: ‘Before, investing to make a company profitable was 
linked to production … what is happening today is that now it is linked to “profits” 
[ganancias] which is a different concept, a completely abstract concept because 
profits are not produced in factories but in the stock exchange market, and this is 
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Moreover, while abstraction in profit making becomes hegemonic, distancing 
produces another kind of abstraction, namely the total loss of responsibility of 
the employers towards workers they don’t know. Workers, moreover, lose the 
material ability to pressure the boss, who is not linked to a particular territory either 
materially or in any other way. Workers try to ‘de-globalize globalization’ and 
re-embed it in proximate networks of concrete responsibilities, in a context where 
capital is increasingly mobile and increasingly abstract. But many, as Ismael, feel 
this is a lost battle: ‘First products fall, then workshops fall and then plants fall, no 
way we are going to stand the pull.’ 
In any case, the Europe that these steel workers were aspiring to was a different 
one. In their imagination, it was a Europe where workers had rights that were 
inexistent in Francoist Spain. But they got trapped in the hegemonic macroeconomic 
technical language of incipient neoliberal capitalism from the beginning, in order to 
consolidate democracy. Although, for many in Spain, the solution is still Europe, an 
imaginary [Northern] Europe that knows the mechanisms of economic success,14 
many voices, sensing the loss of common purpose among the founding European 
nations, are beginning to raise doubts. 
In January 2010, as Spain was starting its turn in the EU presidency, José Ignacio 
Torreblanca, then Director of the Madrid office of the European Council on Foreign 
Relations pointed out: 
 
[T]he evolution of the European political project which has led to the 27 member EU 
has cast doubt on Ortega y Gasset’s virtuous circle (‘Spain is the problem, Europe the 
solution’) which up until now had dominated our foreign policy. If ‘more Europe’ does 
not necessarily mean ‘more Spain’, the Europeanism which has guided our European 
policy for the last twenty five years is no longer the automatic answer to each new 
challenge. Indeed, rather the opposite would seem to be the case; in the new context, it 
is completely legitimate to ask how much Europe Spain needs to achieve its ends, on a 
case-by-case basis. (Torreblanca 2010: 1–2; see also Elordi 2012) 
 
On the one hand, the present-day reconfiguration of neoliberal capitalism within 
lines of unlimited competition is reproducing in Europe the same divisive territo- 
rialized conflicts that the EEC was set up to prevent. In Spain, a form of economic 
nationalism (or regionalism) is understood by different agents as forwarding their 
aims. The language of cooperation between local economic and political actors is 
used by workers as a bulwark against globalized firms’ attack on labour, while it is 
used by firms as a means to force labour to comply with internal restructuring and to 
press their claims against environmental and labour regulations negatively affecting 
costs in Europe. 
On the other hand, in a conjuncture of unprecedented wealth polarization, lines 
of class solidarity are not well defined. They are being erased by flexible production 
structures that have resulted in subcontracting many tasks to small firms, often 
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an increasing differentiation among ‘permanent’ in-firm labour and ‘precarious’ 
subcontract labour (Parry 2009; Narotzky 2015a; Sanchez and Strümpell 2014). But 
the so-called stable workers in the main firm are themselves struggling to keep their 
jobs in the global firm. Here, lines of class (solidarity of all the workers in the firm 
and in the sector) are obscured by the dominant hegemonic language of profitability 
and competition that has captured workers’ logic in their struggle for survival (see 
Kasmir 2001 for a different kind of shaping of the worker’s self to further the firm’s 
interests). 
Simultaneously, a form of localized, non-ideological politics is emerging as 
a  grassroots response to the overt collusion of economic and political elites with a 
neoliberal programme eroding those social rights that were envisioned as the 
expression of being part of Europe. Parts of the 15-M social movement that 
expressed this rejection of a political system perceived as unrepresentative of 
ordinary people’s needs is in a process of institutionalization.15  They present the 
main political opposition to a ruling ‘caste’ of colluding economic and political 
interests that oppresses ‘decent people’ (Monedero 2013), paradoxically setting the 
conflict in moral terms rather than in political economic terms (Narotzky 2015b). 
In contrast, other voices stemming from a reconfiguration of the class perspective 
still speak of the ‘world of work’ as inclusive of many different experiences and 
positions within the capitalist structure but fundamentally based on its members’ 
common lack of economic and political power, where the struggle against financial 
capital (in its diverse impact on powerless economic agents) would become a new 
rallying point (Narotzky 2015a; Collins 2012). 
It is difficult to guess, in the wake of an increasing global discontent caused by 
precarious livelihoods all over the world, what will be the emerging identities that 
will take industrial workers’ struggle beyond a neoliberal language of contention 
and ordinary people beyond moral claims. However, what seems to be losing force 
in southern Europe is the expectation that becoming a member of the European 
Union was a project for the benefit of the world of work. The spatial reconfigura- 
tions of hopes, claims and politics expresses the demise of a dream of wellbeing 
tied to an imagination of a Europe oriented, as Robert Schuman’s (1950) declaration 
expressed it, towards the ‘equalization and improvement of the living conditions of 
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am responsible for the contents of this paper. I am particularly grateful to 
Claire Montgomery and Elena González-Polledo who conducted interviews in 
Asturias and to Irene Sabaté who was also part of the Spanish team. The ICREA 
Academia Programme of the Generalitat de Catalunya provided a five-year 
fellowship that enabled me to dedicate more time to research. I also wish to 
thank Sharryn Kasmir and Gavin Smith for their comments on a first draft. 
2.  In an excellent critique of Ortega’s dictum, Gustavo Bueno, the Asturian 
philosopher, underlines the racist assumptions that are enclosed in it: ‘Ortega 
is saying here: Europe is the Spirit; Spain, separated from Europe, is close to 
Africa, is barbarian, is Nature […] Europe is, for Ortega, the Spirit, Culture par 
excellence, raising above the barbarian Nature, represented by Africa. Europe 
is the fruit of the “divine inspiration” of the peoples created by the Roman 
Empire. The four or five great European nations come from this origin (France, 
Germany, England, Italy, Spain) that have followed their destiny of world 
expansion without ever losing their unity. A unity which is not only spiritual 
(“cultural”) but is also political.’ He stresses as well the point that Ortega 
sees the ‘problem of Spain’ in terms of a lack of internal cohesion paradoxi- 
cally predicated in the incapability of generating an elite capable of leading 
the ‘masses’. ‘In any case the problem of Spain is diagnosed as a “congenital 
weakness of its unity”, as “invertebrate” will be regularly expressed as a chronic 
illness […]. In our days Spain’s illness […] manifests itself as particularism: 
particularism of the guilds, “particularism of the workers”, particularism of the 
regions and separatism of the provinces. From its congenital illness emerge 
the pathological trends that endanger the continuity of the Spanish organism, 
tearing it apart.’ 
3 The declaration also included ‘the equalization and improvement of the living 
conditions of workers in these industries’ among the tasks with which this 
common High Authority was charged. 
4.   It is important to know that the major economic advisors of the regime were 
intellectual brokers of American models. This was the case of personalities 
such as Antonio Garrigues Díaz-Cañabate, married to the daughter of one of 
the first ITT representatives in Spain (an influence that would be taken up by 
his sons Antonio and Emilio), the Urquijo family bank – an Urquijo is now 
the president of Arcelor-Mittal Spain and the president of the Spanish steel 
business association – also originally involved with ITT interests, Andrés 
Moreno, director general of the Banco Hispano Americano during twenty- 
five years  and  the  main  interlocutor  with  the American  banks  extending 
credit, Fermín de la Sierra, Managing Director of the Comisión Nacional de 
Productividad Industrial (CNPI; the Spanish centre of productivity, established 
in 1952) who had a grant in 1946 to study at the University of Chicago under 
Milton Friedman, returning to the INI in 1947, Javier Benjumea, founder of 
Abengoa one of the main engineering infrastructures companies, the Aguirre 
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in the US military bases construction, etc. It is also important to recall that 
American-style business schools were founded through the public CNPI 
directed by de la Sierra with strong American support as well as that of the INI 
president Suanzes – EOI and EAE – in 1957 with the support of Suanzes (INI), 
the private Business Schools supported by the Jesuits (ICADE and ESADE) 
and by the Opus Dei (IESE) in 1958, and exchange programmes that were 
directly addressed at acquiring business management techniques in American 
universities (Puig and Álvaro 2003). 
5.   Fieldwork in Asturias was carried out by Claire Montgomery in 2010 and 
Elena González-Polledo in 2011 under my direction, for the Project ‘Models 
and their Effects on Development Paths: An Ethnographic and Comparative 
Approach to Knowledge Transmission and Livelihood Strategies’ (MEDEA), 
FP7-CT-2009-225670, coordinated by Victoria Goddard. Transcription of the 
interviews was done by Diana Sarkis and Jaime Palomera at the Universitat de 
Barcelona. The ethnography consisted mostly of interviews with steel workers, 
union representatives and other institutional actors. A qualitative survey of 
households comprising fifteen households in Galicia and forty-four households 
in Asturias was conducted respectively by Irene Sabaté and Elena González- 
Polledo. Results were formalized so as to be comparable with results in other 
field sites (in Argentina and Slovakia). 
6.   The ‘backwardness’ of the Spanish economy in the key industrial sector of 
steel was not a result of applying a different analysis or policies. The main 
difference in Spanish political economy was the state of repression and fear 
that affected workers’ claims for better salaries and working conditions. This 
enabled a higher rate of exploitation that provided rents from labour that 
inhibited private investment, a situation of absolute surplus value extraction in 
Marxian terms. Another difference was that private heavy industry firms, often 
related to the banking sector, were in the hands of elites often supporting the 
regime. State intervention protected them not only from external competitors 
but also from internal competitors sustaining a situation of oligopoly in the 
sector (Clavera et al. 1973; Buesa and Pires 2002). In fact, the creation of 
large public steelworks in the 1950s was an attempt to create some internal 
competition that would drive private firms to invest and increase productivity. 
However, this contradicted the personal support networks that were essential 
to the maintenance of the regime. As a result, the state inhibited investment in 
public industry to the benefit of private firms during the Planes de Desarrollo 
in the 1960s, enabling the continuity of small private and inefficient steel 
mills. These competed for public funds with the large and potentially profitable 
public integrated steelworks. Political and economic elites were entangled in 
patronage networks that produced benefits through the sacking of public funds 
and the obstruction of internal competition. 
7.   Justo  Domínguez  adds:  ‘In  a  not  so  distant  future,  scholars  will  have  to 













World Anthropologies in Practice 
 
 
very saliently to industrial relations, has been the understanding of reality, 
superseding its own history and tradition without renouncing it, with UGT 
commemorating its centennial as the largest union in Spain. In order to get 
there it was necessary to design a trade union model based on negotiation and 
pressure, open to all workers, without losing because of it its character and 
conscience as an instrument for the transformation of society’ (1990: 103). 
8.   This might also be the result of the industrial paternalist phase of the large 
heavy industries where the firm (public or private) provided housing, education, 
health services, leisure and religious services to families of workers (Bogaerts 
2000; Sierra Álvarez 1990). 
9.   Profitability, however, seems to have been more of a rhetorical argument used 
by management to explain the need to close plants to reduce overcapacity 
which was the real aim. See Hudson and Sadler (1989: 70–2) for the Consett 
(BSC) steelworks in the UK in the early 1980s. 
10.   The meaning here is that of a public, paternalist, enterprise that ‘cares’ for the 
workers, and an abstract private enterprise that does not care. 
11.   On 11 June 2013 the European Commission issued an Action Plan for Steel in 
which the negative consequences of some environmental regulations for the 
steel industry (European Emission Trading System for CO2) are considered 
and calls for a reassessment of regulation (European Commission 2013). 
12.   Forli (Italy), July 2011. 
13.   Galicia is still a region receiving ‘structural funds’ (meant to help towards 
convergence) while Asturias has been redefined as a phasing-out region, 
meaning that it would be eligible for ‘structural funds’ in a EU15 but it is not 
in the enlarged EU27. 
14.   After the financial crisis of 2008, with an unemployment rate of 20 per cent, 
the social-democratic Prime Minister (PSOE), José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, 
commemorating Spain’s twenty-five years of membership in what is now the 
European Union declared: ‘From the Spanish perspective, over the course 
of twenty-five years, we have had to make considerable efforts in order to 
restructure our productive sectors, to take advantage of European funds, and 
to meet, on time, the requirements for entrance into the Euro, and to accept, 
definitively, the requirements of supra-nationality when making decisions. And 
it has always been worth it: always.’ (12 June 2010, Royal Palace, Madrid) 
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